Expressivism, Pragmatism and
Representationalism
Sydney, 29–31 August 2007
Timetable : Abstracts : Venue : Registration : Accommodation
: Transport : Enquiries
Speakers at this meeting will include Simon Blackburn (Cambridge), Bob
Brandom (Pittsburgh), Alexis Burgess (Stanford), Jamie Dreier (Brown), Allan Gibbard (Michigan),
David Macarthur (Sydney), Philip Pettit (Princeton), Huw Price
(Sydney), Geoff Sayre-McCord (UNC, Chapel Hill) and Amie Thomasson
(Miami).
Themes
Issues to be discussed will
include:
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The relation between pragmatism and expressivism as manifest in the work of Brandom (e.g., in his 2006 Locke Lectures), on the one hand, and writers such as Blackburn and Gibbard, on the other.
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The role, if any, of representationalism in both programs. In what sense does Brandom's program make sense of representationalism, or intentionality (see, e.g., Lecture 6 of his Locke lectures)? In Blackburn's program, is there a well-motivated "bifurcation" between genuine and quasi representations? If so, how is it to be drawn, and what do the two have in common? (Is what is in common captured by Brandom's inferentialist account of assertion? If so, is this a problem for the idea that that program could yield genuine intentionality?)
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The issue of "creeping minimalism" — does semantic minimalism undermine the "bifurcation thesis"? If not, why not? If so, is that an acceptable outcome, or an argument against minimalism?
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The relation of all of these issues to other philosophical issues and programs: e.g., to naturalism, analytic metaphysics, Wright's brand of pluralism ...
Copies of some of the papers and related background reading
will be available here before the event.
This workshop will be immediately followed by a conference on Moral
Cognition and Meta-Ethics, organised by Philip Gerrans
(Adelaide) & Jeanette Kennett (CAPPE ANU). Further details are here.
Provisional timetable
(Click on titles for abstracts and/or draft papers
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Wednesday 29 August |
Thursday 30 August |
Friday 31 August |
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9.30 — 11.00 Huw Price
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9.30 — 11.00 Bob Brandom |
9.00 — 10.30 Geoff Sayre-McCord |
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Morning Tea |
Morning Tea |
Morning Tea |
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11.30 — 1.00 Simon Blackburn |
11.30 — 1.00 Philip Pettit |
11.00 — 12.30 Allan Gibbard |
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Lunch |
Lunch |
Lunch — end of EPR Workshop |
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2.30 — 4.00 |
2.30 — 4.00 |
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Afternoon Tea |
Afternoon Tea |
|
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4.30 — 6.00 |
4.30 — 6.00 |
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|
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6.30 — 8.00
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Abstracts
Simon Blackburn (Cambridge)
Pragmatism: All or Some
Draft paper here.
Bob Brandom (Pittsburgh)
Towards an Analytic Pragmatism
Abstract (actually first page of handout) here, draft paper here.
[This talk is based on the first of Bob Brandom's 2006 Locke
Lectures. Follow the link for the complete set.]
Jamie Dreier (Brown)
Creeping Minimalism
Background reading here.
Allan Gibbard (University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor)
Meaning and Epistemic Oughts
Can we understand the concepts of meaning and mental
content as normative concepts, as matters of “ought” in some
sense? Certain oughts attach invariably to meaning, for instance:
If one ought to accept that snow is white, then one ought to accept
that something is white. (1)
This normative pattern is closely tied to the nature of the concept
“something”. The oughts in question are of a primitive,
emotionally flavorless kind that, applied to beliefs, are epistemic
oughts of a kind that isn’t crudely pragmatic.
Characterizing the concept of meaning in terms of these oughts would
address two problems with treating the concept of meaning as a
naturalistic concept. First, the idealization problem: what
distinguishes the ideal dispositions that fit in neatly with meaning
from our messy actual dispositions? The ideal dispositions, we
can say, are dispositions to believe as one ought. Second, the
automaticity problem: why do certain oughts go with meaning so
automatically?
Characterizing meaning in terms of epistemic oughts, however,
encounters problems of its own. Many epistemic oughts are
substantive and not matters of meaning alone—the oughts of induction
that govern predicting experiences, for instance. What
distinguishes oughts of meaning like (1) from substantive oughts?
The talk examines what can be done in this regard.
Philip Pettit (Princeton)
Perspective in Representation
This essay is an attempt to set out a view of our assertoric
forms of discourse that is broadly representationalist and realist in
character but that makes room for the role of perspective in the
representation we achieve. There are two sorts of opposition to the
viewpoint defended. One is a neutralist realism that would reject the
perspectivism of the view; the other is a form of perspectivism that
would reject the realism. I try to situate my perspectivist realism
midway between these extremes.
Draft paper here.
Huw Price (Sydney)
Expressivism, Pluralism & Representationalism — a
New Bifurcation Thesis
Blackburn's quasi-realist program faces the following dilemma. The more
successful it is in explaining why non-descriptive declaratives (e.g.,
moral claims) behave like "genuinely descriptive" claims, the less need
it has for the assumption that there is any such thing as a genuinely
descriptive claim; the more prospect there is for simply dispensing
with the so-called Bifurcation Thesis — the view that there is a
theoretically significant distinction between descriptive and
non-descriptive uses of declarative language.
In my view, this is a feature not a fault. In this talk, I want to
argue that quasi-realism thus finds a natural ally in Brandom's
inferentialist account of assertion, and that the true implications of
both are best understood in terms of a new Bifurcation Thesis: a
distinction between an "internal" inferentially-grounded notion of
representation, and an "external" environment-tracking notion of
representation. I propose that the right way to formulate the
traditional insights of expressivism is in terms of this new
Bifurcation Thesis, rather than the old Thesis; and that the basic
confusion, fostered rather than eliminated by the old Thesis, is to run
these two notions of representation together.
Draft paper here. [The
previous work cited in this paper is all available here,
as are the recent papers mentioned in Simon Blackburn's paper
above.]
Geoff Sayre-McCord (UNC,
Chapel Hill)
Rational Agency and Normative
Concepts
Draft paper here.
Amie Thomasson (Miami)
Modal Expressivism and Metaphysical Pragmatism
Modal conventionalism was among the oldest forms of modal
expressivism. But it faced a barrage of criticism that led to decades
of neglect of expressivist approaches to modality, and contributed to
the dominance of hyper-realist views of modality as reactions against
the apparent failings of conventionalism. Here I develop an
expressivist line on modality inspired by earlier conventionalist
views, showing how it can be defended against the major lines of
criticism to which conventionalism has been-and still is-subjected. I
show how this view is able to account for modal truth without positing
modal properties as truthmakers and to provide a route for
understanding knowledge of modal facts without relying on perceptual
analogies, thus mitigating the ontological and epistemological worries
of hyperrealism. Given the centrality of modality to a range of other
metaphysical debates, this approach also has the potential to deflate a
great many other debates in metaphysics and suggest that they are best
approached in a pragmatic Carnapian spirit.
Draft paper here.
Venue
The conference will be held in the RAIA Auditorium at the
historic Tusculum
mansion, 3 Manning St, Potts Point. Tusculum is marked in the
centre of this map.
For a walking tour including Tusculum, and an introduction to the colourful history of this part of Sydney — where "Everybody is wicked", or once was — see this publication from the City of Sydney.
Registration
The
conference is open to all. Full-fee registration costs $60, with an additional late
registration fee of $20 for all registrations received after Friday 17 August 2007. Student/unwaged
registration is $20, or $40 for late registrations. Registration
includes morning and afternoon refreshments.
To register, simply download
this form, complete your payment details, and return the form by
mail or fax to the address indicated.
(Speakers are not required to register. Speakers at the Moral Cognition and Meta-ethics Conference will also be registered gratis by default, but are requested to email John Cusbert to confirm their participation, for catering purposes.)
Accommodation
There is plenty of other accommodation in Potts Point and
Kings Cross, within walking distance of the conference. Listed below
are some options, with approximate (2006) prices. For those on a very
tight budget, there are also
numerous backpackers' hostels on Victoria Street.
Accommodation options (moderately priced)
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Challis Lodge |
$55 per night for a single room (shared bathroom) Stay seven nights for the price of five!
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Holiday Lodge Hotel |
$55-$100 per night for a single room
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Victoria Court Hotel |
Rates on enquiry
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Transport
The best way to get around downtown Sydney is on foot or via public transport. The conference venue and the accommodation listed on this site are all within a 5-10 minute walk from Kings Cross railway station.
From the Airport
You can catch a train from the Airport to Kings Cross station, though you will need to change trains at Central station. The train fare from the Airport is $10. A taxi from the Airport to Potts Point costs about $28. There are also regular shuttle buses from the airport to accomodation in Potts Point. "Kingsford Smith Airport Bus Service" runs one such service, which costs around $8 per person and departs from outside the arrival hall every half hour. There is no need to make a booking.
Parking
Streetside parking is very limited in this area. Listed below are some commercial parking lots within 5-10 minutes walk from the conference venue. Parking charges are around $13 per day.
Kings Cross Car Park Pty Ltd
Ward Ave Kings Cross NSW 2011
ph: (02) 9358 5000
Bayswater Parking Station
33 Bayswater Rd Kings Cross NSW 2011
ph: (02) 9357 7343
Enacon Parking
Cathedral St Woolloomooloo NSW 2011
ph: (02) 9380 8850
Please direct all enquiries to John Cusbert at the following
email address:
john.cusbert@gmail.com