Ontological Commitment
Sydney, 30 November - 1 December 2007
Timetable : Abstracts
: Venue : Registration
: Accommodation : Transport
: Enquiries
Speakers at this meeting will include Berit Brogaard (Missouri/ANU),
Mark Colyvan (Sydney), Uriah Kiegel (Arizona/Sydney), Kristie Miller
(Sydney), Michaelis Michael (UNSW), Luca Moretti (Sydney), Jonathan
Schaffer (ANU) and Amie Thomasson (Miami).
Copies of some of the papers and related background reading
will be available here before the event.
Timetable
|
|
|
|
Uriah Kriegel |
Berit Brogaard |
|
Morning Tea |
Morning Tea |
|
11:30 - 1:00 Jonathan
Schaffer
|
Amie Thomasson |
|
Lunch |
Lunch |
|
Luca Moretti |
Kristie Miller
|
|
Afternoon Tea |
Afternoon Tea |
|
Mark Colyvan |
Michaelis
Michael
|
Abstracts
Making Sense of Ontological Commitment
Berit Brogaard
(Missouri/ANU)
Slides
for the talk
According to Quine, a sentence S commits us to Fs just in case
there must be Fs in order for S to be true. I argue that this and
related criteria of ontological commitment are inadequate, as they
trivialize the notion of ontological commitment. I then offer a
different criterion of ontological commitment in terms of what we are
rationally required to believe. This alternative criterion is in
line with characterizations of ontological commitment offered by Quine
in central works. If, however, this alternative criterion is
correct, then a rather surprising consequence follows: ontological
commitment is not a relation between a sentence and an object or a
class of objects but is rather a relation between an intentional act
and a hyperintension.
The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories
Mark Colyvan
(Sydney)
Slides
for the talk
In this paper I will present an argument for realism about
inconsistent objects. The argument relies on (i) a particular,
plausible version of scientific realism, (ii) classical logic and
(iii) the fact that often our best scientific theories are
inconsistent. It is not clear what we should make of this argument. Is
the argument a reductio of the use of classical logic, at least in
metaphysics? Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism
under consideration? In either case, what are the alternatives? Should
we just buy the conclusion? I will give my (tentative) answers to these
questions.
The dispensability of intentional objects
Uriah Kriegel
(Arizona/Sydney)
Slides
for the talk
If we can, we should avoid ontological commitment
to (merely) intentional objects. I sketch a strategy for doing so. The
strategy is based on two claims. The first is that conscious
intentionality is the only underived or "original" intentionality. The
second is that conscious intentionality does not (constitutively)
involve a relation to an intentional object, because it is "adverbial":
to consciously have a dragon thought is not to think of a dragon, but
to think dragon-wise.
Counter-possibles, space-time and the metaphysics of holes
Kristie
Miller (Sydney)
Slides
for the talk
Metaphysics is largely an a priori business, albeit a business
that is sensitive to the findings of the physical sciences. But
sometimes what the physical sciences tell us about our own world
underdetermines what we should think about the metaphysics of how
things actually are, and even how they could be. This is a paper about
the metaphysics of holes: whether we should be ontologically committed
to them, and if so, what they are. It is generally agreed that what
holes are, if there are any, will depend on the correct account of the
nature of space. But what the correct account is, both in our own and
other worlds, is a controversial matter indeed. So this is also a paper
about the methodology of first-order a priori metaphysics. We hope to
shed light on the latter, and defend a particular conception of
metaphysics, by showing you how our methodology delivers a new account
of holes.
Implicit commitment
Michaelis
Michael (UNSW)
Slides
for the talk
The ontological commitments of a theory are those commitments
which are of the form "There are F's". Some of these are explicitly
stated in stating the theory, some of these are implicit commitments of
the theory. On this score, ontological commitments are a species of
commitments in general. There are two dimensions of analysis this
discussion raises. What sort of relation between a theory and a
sentence sustains this sort of commitment? Second, what sort of
relation between an agent and a theory needs to exist before the agent
is themselves to be convicted of commitment? By focussing on what the
notion of implicit commitment does for us in assessing each other and
our theories we can get purchase on the issues of the nature of
Ontological Commitment itself.
The ontological status of minimal entities
Luca Moretti
(Sydney)
Slides
for the talk
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under minimal
notions, where the latter are defined in terms of only platitudinous
principles such as the Equivalence Schema (S iff it is true that S). In
this paper, I first provide a precise characterization of minimal
notions inspired by Horwich's characterization of minimal truth.
Minimal notions in general have the essential function of allowing the
explicit formulation of blind generalizations. I then argue that we are
committed to the existence of the entities that fall under these
notions. After that, I investigate the ontological status of minimal
entities: are they really existent (like cats and electrons) or are
they mere linguistic projections? I argue that the latter claim is
correct: minimal entities exist only intrinsically to language.
Truthmaker
commitments
Jonathan Schaffer (ANU)
Slides
for the talk
Armstrong argues that truthmaker theory can be used to replace
the
Quinean criterion for commitment, via the principle: to be is to make
true a
truth.
I argue that Armstrongian commitments cannot replace Quinean
commitments,
but
can compliment them -- the Quinean commitments give us what exists,
while
the Armstrongian commitments tell us what among the things that exist
are fundamental.
Trivial transformations and ontological commitments
Amie Thomasson
(Miami)
Slides
for the talk
The central question I will address is this: How are debates
about existence in ontology to be approached and resolved? This leads
into the question: How should we understand existence claims, and what
are their truth-conditions? I will argue that a trivial way of
understanding the truth-conditions for existence claims, combined with
two plausible theses about language, leads to several interesting
conclusions. First, it entails that we should reject any suggested
substantive criteria for entities to 'really' exist (including causal
efficacy, trackability, mind-independence, etc.), thus undermining many
arguments for eliminating various kinds of objects. Second, it entails
that we should reject Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, as
it provides only a sufficient, not necessary, condition for ontological
commitment. Third, it suggests that most efforts at paraphrase in
ontological discussions are misguided. Finally, it suggests that
debates about existence in ontology are straightforwardly resolvable by
a combination of linguistic/conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry.
Venue
The conference will be held in the RAIA Auditorium at the historic
Tusculum mansion, 3 Manning St, Potts Point. Tusculum is marked in the
centre of this map.
Registration
The workshop is free but advanced
registration is required for catering purposes.
To register, simply send an email to luca.moretti@arts.usyd.edu.au
with the subject line "Please register me for Ontological Commitment
Conference".
Accommodation
There is plenty of accommodation in Potts Point and Kings Cross,
within walking distance of the conference. Listed below are some
options, with approximate (2006) prices. For those on a very tight
budget, there are also numerous backpackers' hostels on Victoria Street.
|
Challis Lodge
|
$55 per night for a single room (shared bathroom)
|
|
Holiday Lodge Hotel
|
$55-$100 per night for a single room
|
|
Victoria Court Hotel
|
Rates on enquiry
|
Transport
The best way to get around downtown Sydney is on foot or via public
transport. The conference venue and the accommodation listed on this
site are all within a 5-10 minute walk from Kings Cross railway station.
From the Airport
You can catch a train from the Airport to Kings Cross station, though
you will need to change trains at Central station. The train fare from
the Airport is $10. A taxi from the Airport to Potts Point costs about
$28. There are also regular shuttle buses from the airport to
accomodation in Potts Point. "Kingsford Smith Airport Bus Service" runs
one such service, which costs
around $8 per person and departs from outside the arrival hall every
half
hour. There is no need to make a booking.
Parking
Streetside parking is very limited in this area. Listed below are some
commercial parking lots within 5-10 minutes walk from the conference
venue.
Parking charges are around $13 per day.
Kings Cross Car Park Pty Ltd
Ward Ave Kings Cross NSW 2011
ph: (02) 9358 5000
Bayswater Parking Station
33 Bayswater Rd Kings Cross NSW 2011
ph: (02) 9357 7343
Enacon Parking
Cathedral St Woolloomooloo NSW 2011
ph: (02) 9380 8850
Enquiries
Please direct all enquiries to Luca Moretti at the following email
address:
luca.moretti@arts.usyd.edu.au