[1] See most recently his "Real Patterns", Journal of .Philosophy, 88(1991), 27-51.

[2] "Real Patterns", p. 32.

[3] Perhaps the reason this stance is so unpopular is that its naturalism offends Wittgensteinians, while its linguistic character offends post-Wittgensteinians. If so, then it is time for the two sides to adopt the Sprat family's approach to conflict-resolution: hard-nosed post-Wittgensteinians should embrace the stance for its lean naturalism, and Wittgensteinians should embrace it for its rich linguisticism.

[4] It is true that I want to suggest that functional perspectivalism is not necessarily irrealist after all, but this is a rather unorthodox view, and Dennett certainly does not offer any argument to this effect.

[5] "Real Patterns", p. 34, Dennett's italics.

[6] Why is this not simply conceptual perspectivalism? Because of Ryle's emphasis on logical function. A conceptual perspectivalist need not deny that the perspective-dependent concepts are all employed for the same single descriptive purpose.

[7] This doesn't necessarily mean that Ryle is wrong, of course. It may simply mean that in ignoring the functions of language, contemporary philosophy has lost a sensitivity that earlier philosophers possessed.

[8] Note that this would simply by-pass some of the major criticisms of Ryle, such as that of Fodor 1975, who accuses Ryle of being a functional reductionist. It is doubtful whether it is fair to term Ryle a reductionist of any sort--the point is nicely brought out in terms of a contrast between analysis and explanation--but even if he were, in ditching his behaviourism we would ditch what was problematic about his reduction base.

9 Dennett is not the only contemporary philosopher of mind whose view of intentional psychology might be given this Rylean flavour, of course--Davidson, McDowell, Pettit are others--but for present purposes let us continue to use Dennett as our example.

10 "Real Patterns", p. 30.

11 Concept of Mind, p. 24.

[12] Word & Object, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1960, [[section]]27.

[13] "Metaphysical pluralism", Journal of Philosophy, 89(1992), 387-409.

[14] See Blackburn's Spreading the Word, Oxford University Press, 1984, Ch. 5.

[15] "The Message of Wittgenstein", typescript, p. 1.

[16] "The Message of Wittgenstein", typescript, p. 2.

[17] See my Facts and the Function of Truth, Basil Blackwell, New York, 1989.

[18] See "Metaphysical pluralism", Journal of Philosophy, 89(1992), 387-409.

[19] 'The Nature of Naturalism", Proc of the Arist Soc, Supp. Vol. 63, 1992.

[20] "Constitution is not Identity", Mind, 101(1992), 89-105.

[21] A similar point against the supervenience approach has been made by Stephen Schiffer, in Remnants of Meaning., MIT Press, 1987, pp. 153-4. As Schiffer puts it, "Supervenience is just epiphenomenalism without causation." (p. 154)

[22] Philip Pettit, 'The Nature of Naturalism", pp. 10-11 in ts, my italics.

[23] See his "Moral Realism" in Casey, ed., Morality and Moral Reasoning (London: Methuen, 1971), 101-24; Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and "Supervenience Revisited" in Hacking, ed., Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47-67.

[24] There is a powerful and somewhat Rylean card to be played against anyone who would exile psychology on these grounds, namely to point out that according to the philosophical view in question, where psychology goes modality goes also. To exile psychology would be to exile not only Ryle's dispositions, but also probability, causality, laws, and so on--and let science try to survive without that! This card needs to be backed by a defence of the pragmatist treatment of modality on which it relies, of course, which is a task for another time. All the same, one of the ironies of contemporary philosophy of mind is that hard-nosed physicalists make great use of appeals to causality, and in particular to the intuition that all causality is ultimately physical causality. Yet it is surely a conceivable view--indeed it is a view held, as well as conceived, both by Russell and by Ayer--that a really hard-nosed physicalism would regard causation itself as an anthropocentric adornment to the pure physical description of the bare four-dimensional lattice of the world. So contemporary physicalists are apt to build their case on foundations which are doubtfully compatible with their own exacting standards.